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The Dole Bill: Freeing the Telephone
Company Seven?
by

JAMES

P. DENVIR*

I

Introduction
On June 18, 1986, then United States Senate Majority Leader
Robert Dole (R-Kansas) introduced a bill entitled the "Federal
Telecommunications Policy Act of 1986 (the Dole Bill)."' If enacted, this bill would not only dramatically alter government
regulation of the Unites States telecommunications industry,
but it could profoundly affect the industry structure created by
divestiture of the seven former Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs) from American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) pursuant to the 1982 Modified Final Judgment (MFJ or consent
decree) 2 that ended the Department of Justice's antitrust case
against that company.
The United States telecommunications industry is subject to
dual federal regulation by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the United States District Court for the DisB.A., Yale, 1972; J.D., University of Florida, 1975. Mr. Denvir, who was a lead
trial attorney for the Department of Justice in United States v. AT&T, is currently a
partner in the communications and entertainment section of the Washington, D.C.,
office of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. This commentary reflects, among
other things, the author's personal assessment, based on his experience on the AT&T
case, of the factors that led to the Department of Justice's decision to support legislation that would transfer authority over the AT&T consent decree from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to the Federal Communications Commission.
1. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
2. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 226 app. (D.D.C. 1982)
[hereinafter MFJ]. The consent decree was considered and approved in United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom., Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter AT&TI, and is referred to as the
Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), because it was originally intended to be a mere
modification of a 1956 consent decree approved in United States v. Western Elect. Co.,
No. 17-49 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 14, 1949). This case was transferred, given a new docket
number (No. 82-0192), and consolidated with United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co.. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 20, 1974) which resulted in the MFJ. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. at 135 n.4, 137-38.
3. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698.
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trict of Columbia. Under the Communications Act of 1934,1 the
FCC is charged with the responsibility, inter alia,of regulating
the rates and practices of interstate communications common
carriers. Pursuant to the MFJ, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia exercises jurisdiction over the
divested BOCs and, to a much lesser extent, AT&T.'
Under the terms of that judgment, except with the prior permission of the court, the BOCs are essentially precluded from
engaging in businesses other than those left with the companies
at the time of their divestiture from AT&T.6 While the court
has liberally granted requests to engage in lines of business not
dependent on connection to the BOCs' local exchange facilities,
it has generally not granted waivers of the consent decree's
"core restrictions" which prevent the BOCs from providing interexchange telecommunications and information services and
from manufacturing telecommunications equipment.7 The
court also has responsibility under the consent decree, inter
alia, for enforcing equality of the terms and conditions under
which the BOCs provide access to their local exchange facilities to long distance carriers and information services providers. To a large extent, the court's responsibilities under the
MFJ overlap with the FCC's jurisdiction under the Communications Act.
During the public interest proceedings 9 that led to the entry
of the MFJ, the Department of Justice made a commitment to
the court to review the continuing need for the decree's line-of4. 47 U.S.C. § 151-757 (1982, Supp. II 1984 & Supp; III 1985).
5. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231. The district court also exercises jurisdiction over
GTE and its operating companies pursuant to another consent decree settling the Department of Justice's challenge to GTE's acquisition of Sprint, a long distance carrier,
from its parent Southern Pacific Corporation. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984).

6. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 30-40.
8. MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 227, 232-34.
9. Pursuant to a January 21, 1982 court order, the Department of Justice filed a
Competitive Impact Statement setting forth the terms of the proposed decree and its
likely effect on competition. Competitive Impact Statement in Connection with Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 7169, 7170 (1982) [hereinafter
CIS]. Over 6,000 comments were filed on the proposed judgment, to which the Department of Justice responded on May 20, 1982. Response to Public Comments on
Proposed Modification of Final Judgment, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,319, 23,320 (1982) [hereinafter Response to Comments]. Pursuant to a further order of the court, the Department of Justice and over 100 interested parties submitted further briefing on several
designated issues. Two days of oral argument were held on June 29-30, 1982. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. at 145-47.
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business restrictions every third year following the BOCs' divestiture from AT&T and report its recommendations to the
court. 10 The first such report from the Department is due in
January 1987."1
Although actual conflicts between the FCC and the court
have so far been avoided, a number of parties, and in particular
the BOCs, have contended that subjection to overlapping regulation is inefficient and burdensome, and that federal jurisdiction over rates, practices, entry, and exit should reside solely
with the FCC. Though the ostensible purpose of the proposed
legislation is merely to consolidate jurisdiction in the FCC,
many believe that, because of what is perceived as a more lenient attitude in the FCC toward BOC reintegration into lines of
business now foreclosed to them by the MFJ, the legislative intent and the Dole Bill's likely effect would be to grant BOCs a
much greater degree of business freedom than they now enjoy.
Fueled in part by a mounting trade deficit in telecommunications, there appears to be growing bipartisan support in Congress for removing or substantially easing the MFJ's
restrictions on the BOCs.'2 Support for this approach has existed in various parts of the Reagan Administration for some
time, particularly in the FCC and the Department of Commerce. However, the Department of Justice's support for the
Dole Bill, which would greatly reduce the Department's telecommunications policy role, heralds a significant change in
thinking about the proper significance of antitrust considerations in the formulation of telecommunications policy.
While the prospects for passage of legislation are generally
regarded as having been distinguished by the results of the November election, the current view of the Department of Justice-that jurisdiction over the telecommunications industry
ought properly to reside solely in the FCC-may have important implications for the Department's January 1987 report to
the court on possible modifications of the consent decree and
for its continuing enforcement of the consent decree.
10. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court's Memorandum of
May 25, 1982, at 31, AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (filed June 14, 1982) [hereinafter Brief in
Response to Court's Memorandum of May 25, 1982].
11. [Ed. note: The report was filed on Monday, February 2, 1987, Report and Recommendations of the United States concerning the Line-of-Business Restrictions Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 2, 1987).]
12. See FCC Week, MAY 19, 1986, at 4; FCC Week, MAY 17, 1986, at 2.
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Following a brief description of the AT&T case, the consent
decree that settled it, and post-judgment enforcement, this
commentary discusses the rationale for the Department of Justice's support for consolidation of jurisdiction in the FCC and
offers some thoughts on the risks of the legislation to the
BOCs.

II

The AT&T Case
On November 20, 1974, the United States brought a civil action against AT&T, alleging violations of section two of the
Sherman Act 13 and seeking divestiture of the BOCs from
AT&T and divestiture and dissolution of Western Electric,
AT&T's equipment manufacturing subsidiary. Prior to trial,
the government refined its relief request, seeking divestiture of
the BOCs in a manner that would separate the local exchange
functions of the BOCs from AT&T's interexchange, manufacturing, and other functions. The government requested divestiture of Western Electric only if the court declined to order
substantial divestiture of local exchange operations from
14
AT&T.
The basic theory of the AT&T case was that, as a rate base,
rate-of-return regulated monopolist, 5 AT&T had both the incentive and ability to leverage the monopoly power it enjoyed
in the BOCs' provision of exchange telecommunications to disadvantage its competitors in the provision of interexchange
services, customer premises equipment, and network equipment.' 6 According to the government's allegations, AT&T had
acted on these incentives and opportunities by cross-subsidizing
its competitive ventures with revenues derived from its monop13. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1986).
14. CIS, supra note 9, at 7172.
15. Prior to divestiture, the Bell System was subject to regulation at both the state
and federal level. The states regulated the intrastate telephone service provided by
the BOCs, both local and intrastate long distance. The FCC regulated interstate long
distance telephone services provided by AT&T. Divestiture did not affect federal or
state regulatory jurisdiction. Both state and federal regulators continue to limit telephone companies to reasonable earnings levels by restricting net revenues to a particular percentage (rate of return) of telephone company investment in regulated
property (rate base). According to the government's theory, rate base regulation combined with the monopoly power of the local exchange gave AT&T special incentives
to engage in cross-subsidization of competitive ventures and other anticompetitive
activities.
16. CIS, supra note 9, at 7171.

1986]

THE DOLE BILL

oly services and by discriminating against competitors in the
connections of their products and services to the monopoly bottleneck 7 exchange facilites of the BOCs.'8 According to the
government, regulation had proven incapable of dealing effectively with these forms of anticompetitive conduct. The fundamental premises of the relief sought-separation of the Bell
System's monopoly from its competitive operations-were that
the vertically integrated structure of the Bell System effectively frustrated regulatory efforts to prevent anticompetitive
conduct, and that only a structural remedy that severed common ownership would permit the emergence of effective competition, where such competition was feasible.'"
Trial of the AT&T case began on January 15, 1981, with opening statements and the first witnesses appeared on March 4,
1981. On January 8, 1982, approximately three weeks before
the projected end of the trial, a proposed settlement was filed
with the court in the form of a modification of a 1956 final judgment entered in United States v. Western Electric Co.,2° and a
21
motion for simultaneous dismissal of the AT&T case.
The MFJ, as initially proposed to the court by the parties,
required the divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T in a manner
that would separate the exchange telecommunications functions of the BOCs from the other operations of the Bell System.
It also would have absolutely banned the BOCs from providing
any product or service other than exchange telecommunications and from providing access to exchange facilities and services to two groups of users: interexchange carriers and
information services providers.2 2 As originally envisioned, the
line-of-business restrictions would be removed only when it
could be demonstrated that the local exchange functions of the
BOCs lost their monopoly bottleneck characteristics. 23
17. A firm that controls facilities to which its competitors must have access in
order to compete effectively is generally obligated under the antitrust laws to provide
such access on fair and reasonable terms. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S.
383 (1912). Such facilities are sometimes described as "monopoly bottlenecks" or "essential facilities."
18. CIS, supra note 9, at 7173.
19. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 187.
20. No. 17-49 (D.N.J., filed Jan. 14, 1949), redocketed as No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. 1982).
The decree was approved Jan. 24, 1956. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 138 & n.15.
21. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 140-41.
22. Id. at 141-43.
23. Id. at 195. See also June 14, 1982 Brief, supra note 10, at 29-30.
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After a lengthy public interest proceeding, the court found
that the proposed consent judgment would be in the public interest if the parties to the consent decree would agree to several substantive changes.24 Among the most significant were
the addition of a provision that would permit the BOCs to provide, but not manufacture, customer premises equipment25 and
a new provision, section VIII(C), that would permit waivers of
the consent decree's line-of-business restrictions on a "showing
by the petitioning BOC that there is no substantial possibility
that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in
the market it seeks to enter. 2'' The parties notified the court
of their agreement to these changes and the MFJ was entered
by the court on August 24, 1982.27
The changes agreed to by the parties and incorporated in the
MFJ were highly significant in the fundamental approach they
signalled to enforcement of the line-of-business restrictions.
Though the court expressed appreciation for the "conceptual
neatness" of the government's preference for an absolute prohibition on BOC participation in competitive markets, 2 it
found that there was no justification for excluding the BOCs
from markets where there was no significant danger that the
BOCs could use their monopoly position in exchange telecommunications to disadvantage competitors. 29 The court found
these conditions to be satisfied with respect to the customer
premises equipment market and directory advertising on the
basis of the trial record and the record developed in the public
interest proceedings preceding the entry of the decree . 0 The
same considerations led the court to insist on the inclusion of
section VIII(G). 31 Although unanticipated by either the parties
or the court, the addition of section VIII(C) to the decree
opened the flood gates to waiver petitions by the BOCs, and as
discussed more fully below, changed dramatically the nature of
the roles of the Department of Justice and the court with respect to the decree from what had initially been anticipated.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
Id. at 225; MJF, 552
AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
Id. at 186-95.
Id. at 191-94.

at 224, 225.
F. Supp. at 231.
at 225; MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
at 131.
at 187.

31. See id. at 194-95, 225; MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231.

1986]

THE DOLE BILL

•III
Post-Entry Enforcement
Within a month of the BOCs' divestiture from AT&T, petitions from the BOCs requesting waivers of the decree's line-ofbusiness restrictions began to flow into court. By mid-1986,
over 100 such requests for waiver had been filed.2 The vast
majority of the requests were for permission to engage in businesses removed from the provision of exchange telecommunications.33 As of mid- 1986, over eighty percent of those requests
had been approved by both the Department of Justice and the
court.34
In response to the first several waiver requests, the court, in
a July 26, 1984 opinion, set out the standards that would govern
the disposition of all such requests in the future.3 5 Several of
the BOCs had contended that they should be permitted to enter
lines of business unrelated to telecommunications without the
prior permission of the court and without conditions as to the
manner of their entry and participation on the ground that
nontelecommunications activities could present little risk to
competition. The court rejected these arguments, 6 as well as
arguments that the court should not consider factors other than
those competitive considerations specifically enumerated in
section VIII(C) in ruling on waiver requests.3 7 Notwithstanding these rulings, the court indicated that it would generally
grant BOC waiver requests if such requests met four conditions38 and did not involve participation in interexchange serv32. Ginsburg Remarks, supra note 11, at 7.
33. This is explained, at least in part, by the fact that, according to the theory of
the AT&T case and the consent decree, the competitive dangers inherent in the provision of both monopoly and competitive products and services attenuates as the distance between the monopoly and competitive markets increases. For example, an
unrelated business is less likely to depend on interconnection to local exchange facilities. Further, the ability to cross-subsidize competitive ventures with monopoly revenues is lessened as common costs between the monopoly and competitive enterprises
are reduced.
34. Telephone conference with Department of Justice attorney on AT&T staff
(Aug. 1985).
35. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 870-72 (D.D.C. 1984).
36. Id. at 868-70.
37. Id. at 855-58, 860.
38. The court indicated that waiver requests generally will be regarded favorably
if: (1) the competitive activities are conducted in separate subsidiaries; (2) the competitive subsidiaries obtain their own debt financing on their own credit; (3) the total
estimated net revenues of all waiver activities are not in excess of 10% of total BOC
net revenues, and; (4) the petitioning BOC agrees that its competitive activities will be

COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 9:113

ices, information services, or telecommunications equipment
manufacturing.39 As to the latter requirement, the court indicated that it would not even entertain requests for waiver until
the BOCs' local exchange operations had lost their monopoly
bottleneck characteristics.4"
As discussed above, the court has approved the vast majority
of waiver requests, most of which have involved businesses that
do not depend on access to BOC facilities. However, consistent
with the Department of Justice's urgings, the court has not
granted waivers of the consent decree's restrictions on the provision of interexchange telecommunications, information services, and manufacture of telecommunications equipment, and
has strictly interpreted the reach of those "core restrictions."
It was held, for example, that certain activities which may be
associated with the provision of shared tenant services constitute prohibited interexchange telecommunications 4 1 and that,
absent a waiver, the provision of paging and cellular telephone
services outside a BOC's service area is prohibited by the consent decree.42

IV
The Department of Justice's Position on the
Dole Bill
After having negotiated, litigated in support of, and strictly
enforced a consent judgment that places substantial responsibility in the Department of Justice and the United States District Court for the regulation of a critical segment of the United
States telecommunications industry, the Department, less than
three years after divestiture, has now voiced its strong support
for a bill that is intended to transfer that authority to the
FCC.

43

There have been several developments since the MFJ was
entered in 1982 that likely have contributed to the Department
of Justice's decision to relinquish responsibility for the consent
subject to the visitorial and monitoring provisions of the decree. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 870-72.
39. Id. at 868.

40. Id.
41. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090, 1099-1104 (D.D.C. 1986),
rev'd in part, slip op. 86-5118 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 1986).
42. Id. at 1104-09.
43. See Ginsburg Remarks, supra note 11, at 1-2.
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decree to the FCC. One of the more significant of these is the
way in which the roles of the Department and the court have
evolved. As originally envisioned by both the Department and
the court, the consent decree was to provide a long term solution to monopoly bottleneck problems by prohibiting, with only
minor and infrequent exceptions, expansion of BOC business
activities beyond those activities left with the BOCs at divestiture. The consent decree's core restrictions were to be revisited
every three years, with the expectation that technological and
economic developments would ultimately erode the monopoly
power of the local exchange, at which time the rationale for the
restrictions would disappear and the restrictions would be
removed.
Beyond its responsibility to reexamine the continuing need
for the restrictions, it was anticipated that the Department of
Justice's principal role following divestiture would be enforcement of the behavioral injunctions of the MFJ- particularly
the implementation of the decree's equal exchange access requirements; a process to be essentially completed by September 1986. The original intent, therefore, was that the ongoing
responsibilities of the Department and the court would be relatively minor, limited essentially to implementation of divestiture and monitoring of the post-divestiture re-engineering of
local exchange networks to accommodate a competitive, multicarrier environment.
As discussed above, however, the unanticipated appetite of
the BOCs for diversification of their businesses, and the availability of an explicit mechanism to do so in the form of section
VIII(C) has meant a greatly expanded and more pervasive role
for the Department of Justice in oversight of BOC business decisions than the Department initially supposed would be required. In addition, in part because of changes in technology
and market, and in part because of the inherent nature of definitional boundaries, the Department and the court have been
forced to devote substantial time and resources to delineating
the precise scope of the restrictions in operational and technological terms.
The pervasiveness of the Department of Justice's role in
ongoing oversight of BOC affairs has led it to question whether,
as a law enforcement agency with solely an antitrust charter, it
is appropriate for it to continue what is, in effect, detailed regu-
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latory oversight of the BOCs' business plans." The Department's support for the Dole Bill reflects an explicit judgment
that a regulatory agency with a broad public interest mandate
and greater staffing and technical expertise is the more appro45
priate entity to carry out those activities.
Necessarily implicit in that judgment is a perception that the
Department of Justice's previous reservations regarding the efficacy of regulation either were misplaced, or are of reduced
relevance to post-divestiture enforcement activities. There are
some reasons that support the latter explanation. For example,
the distrust of regulation which figured so prominently in the
AT&T case did not rest on a view that one agency is superior to
another or that the judicial system is inherently superior to
regulatory processes. Rather, the underlying premise of the
case was that traditional regulatory methods, such as the imposition of accounting and reporting requirements, are inherently
incapable of efficiently and effectively dealing with competitive
problems that are structural in nature. In the Department's
view, these structural problems were particularly acute because of the nationwide integration of monopoly bottleneck
and bottleneck-dependent competitive activities that existed
within the Bell System.4 6 Traditional regulatory methods
could not change incentives to engage in leveraging and, in the
Department's view, could have only a minimal effect on the
ability to act on those incentives.4 7 In contrast, a structural solution-separating monopoly from competitive functionscould effectively eliminate both the incentive and the opportunity to engage in anticompetitive conduct.
The MFJ achieved precisely the structural relief the Department of Justice sought. Implicit in the Department's position
on jurisdiction is that the major issues remaining under the
consent decree-to what extent and under what conditions
should the BOCs be permitted to reintegrate-are not inherently exclusively antitrust in their implications, nor necessarily
44. See id. at 7-9.
45. Id. at 9.
46. Prior to divestiture, the Bell System controlled over 80% of the local exchangelines and provided the vast majority of long distance telephone service in the
country. The Bell System also provided the majority of customer premises equipment (e.g., telephones and key systems) and, through Western Electric, satisfied most
of the demand of the BOCs for equipment used in the provision of service. See CIS,
supra note 9, at 7172-73.
47. See Response to Comments, supra note 9, at 23,336.
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susceptible to resolution in strictly antitrust terms. Viewed
from this perspective, it is difficult to argue with the abstract
principle that an antitrust agency and an antitrust court are
better equipped to decide such issues than an expert telecommunications agency. Indeed, in principle, it is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that an entity with an expansive public
interest charter and telecommunications expertise is better
suited to make decisions of telecommunications policy significance than an agency with a more limited charter and
expertise.
These same considerations, of course, would have applied
equally, if not with greater force, to the divestiture itself. There
is little doubt that the divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T had
public interest implications at least as encompassing and substantial as those at stake in the determination of the fate of the
line-of-business restrictions. The Department of Justice was
not hesitant to urge divestiture on antitrust grounds, however,
even though the decision affected more than the solely competitive interests. Notwithstanding its limited charter, the Department in fact considered noncompetition-related interests in
recommending that the court enter the MFJ.48 The court reviewed and considered such interests pursuant to the public interest standard that governed its review of the MFJ.4 9 The
court indicated that it will continue to consider the broad public interest implications of its actions in ruling on decree- related matters.5 0
Against this background, the Department of Justice's support for the Dole Bill seems to reflect a change in its thinking
regarding the scope of its proper function as a law enforcement
agency, and its thinking about the degree to which antitrust interests should govern decisions having broader policy significance. At a minimum, the Department's position on
jurisdiction suggests that it has less confidence that antitrust
considerations should play a dominant role in influencing the
structure of the telecommunications industry.
48. See, e.g., Response to Comments, supra note 9, at 23,327-32.
49. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 149-51.
50. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 855, 856.
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V
Potential Risks to the BOCs
The support of the BOCs for the Dole Bill 5 ' reflects, at least
in part, a judgment that the BOCs' interests will be better
served by removal of supervision over the MFJ from the judicial forum in which it is now located to a regulatory forum.
Whether this judgment turns out to be correct depends on several assumptions. Among them is that the legislative process
will not exact a price for the transfer of jurisdiction that exceeds the benefits the BOCs realize from a change in forum.
Another is that a regulatory forum will produce an outcome
that is superior to that which could be achieved in the court.
The validity of either of these assumptions is not free from
doubt.
The Dole Bill is straightforward and contains no obvious
quid pro quos for the change in forum which the legislation
would accomplish. However, the nature of the legislative process itself and the existence of numerous interests affected by
telecommunications policy almost guarantee that the legislation will not pass in its present pristine form.
Several members of Congress have introduced bills and
others have floated proposals in response to the Dole Bill that
suggest the kinds of features that might be attached to telecommunications legislation. These range from proposals to include
in any legislation dealing with the line-of-business restriction's
explicit protections against cross-subsidization and anticompetitive conduct, including open procurement requirements,5 2 to
provisions requiring specific cost allocation methods and royalty payments to ratepayers.5 3 Depending on their specifics as
they develop through the legislative process, any of these proposals could cost the BOCs more than the change is worth.
It is not difficult to imagine, for example, the legislative crea51. See Comm. Daily, June 19, 1986, at 3.
52. Representatives Swift (D-Wash.) and Tauke (R-Iowa) have introduced an
amendment to legislation pending in the House of Representatives which would require that information services providers have comparably efficient interconnection
and which would regulate transactions between competitive ventures. The amendment would also impose open procurement requirements on the BOCs and require
the establishment of accounting safeguards. See Comm. Daily, Aug. 19, 1986, at 1-2.
53. Representatives Wyden (D-Or.), Bryant (D-Tex.), Leland (D-Tex.), Synar (DOkla.) and Luken (D-Ohio) have proposed cost assignment rules and the imposition of
a requirement that the BOCs' information services operations pay a royalty to their
regulated telephone operations. See Comm. Daily, Aug. 19, 1986, at 1-2.
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tion of a regulatory regime to protect against cross-subsidies
and discriminatory interconnection which would both impose
substantial costs and severely limit the ability of the FCC to
tailor safeguards to meet changing technological and market
conditions. Nor is it difficult to conceive of the attachment to
legislation of consumer protection amendments which would
continue or expand market-distorting cross-subsidies.
Since BOC support is probably essential to the passage of any
legislation, it might seem that there is little danger that provisions substantially harmful to BOC interests could be attached
successfully to MFJ legislation since the BOCs could effectively
terminate the entire process by removing their support. It
seems clear that, in view of substantial differences in each
BOC's operations, cost structures, markets, and perceptions of
their long-term roles in the industry, the interests of each BOC
are not identical. What one BOC might consider to be an unacceptably high price to pay for a chance for relief from the consent decree, others might not. Further, there is always the
possibility of a simple miscalculation; what might not seem an
especially burdensome quid pro quo for a change of forum in
the heat of legislative negotiations may prove more costly in
practice than envisioned, or the benefits of the change in forum not so great as imagined. In sum, there is the risk, which
always exists in pursuing relief through the legislative process,
that the inevitable trade-offs that take place will negate or even
overwhelm the benefits in pursuit of which the legislative process was initiated.
If the transfer of jurisdiction is effected successfully, there is
also a risk to the BOCs that the FCC will not be the superior
forum they envisioned for resolving the remaining MFJ issues.
As discussed above, the court has liberally granted the BOCs'
requests to engage in lines of business otherwise prohibited by
the MFJ and it has done so with only relatively insignificant
conditions on the manner and form of their participation in
such businesses. The principle exception, of course, is that the
court so far has not granted significant exemptions from the
specific restrictions which prevent BOC integration into markets closely related to and dependent on exchange services.
The BOCs' support for the transfer legislation therefore must
rest on the expectation that the FCC will take a more flexible
view of BOC entry into these lines of business than the court
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has and that the BOCs will have greater freedom to integrate
into related lines of business sooner than they otherwise would.
Despite this general perception, however, it is not entirely
clear that the FCC would or could act to remove the restrictions expeditiously, or that the relief the BOCs seek could be
obtained more quickly through regulatory processes than
through the judicial system.
The FCC has taken the position in the public interest proceedings leading to the entry of the MFJ that restrictions on
entry are not necessary to protect ratepayer and competitive
interests. 4 It has also stated that it has no policy against the
provision of interexchange services by local exchange carriers. 55 Notwithstanding these indications that the FCC is presently disposed against entry restrictions, because the legislation
as proposed purports to modify only the forum and not the restrictions themselves, the agency would be obligated to give fair
consideration to arguments that entry should continue to be restricted generally, as well as to those arguments directed toward restriction of specific markets and conditions of entry.
Given the distinct characteristics of the interexchange, information services, and equipment markets and differences in the
issues that may be raised by BOC entry into each, the FCC
might well need to examine each separately and, if it determines BOC entry to be in the public interest, devise individually tailored rules to govern participation in each market. Any
participant in the proceedings would have the right to appeal
whatever determinations the FCC ultimately makes. The proceedings required to implement removal or even significant relaxation of the restrictions would therefore likely be both time
consuming and complex.
FCC proceedings might also be subject to some degree of continuing congressional involvement. In the past, the Congress,
through its oversight authority, appropriations power, or
through the naked threat of legislation, has exercised substantial influence over FCC decisionmaking in controversial areas
and has, at times, succeeded in modifying 6 or forestalling 7
54. See Brief of the Federal Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae at 2942, AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 74-1698).
55. Policies to be Followed in the Authorization of Common Carrier Facilities to
Provide Telecommunications Service off of the Island of Puerto Rico, Notice of Inquiry in Docket No. 86-309, FCC 86-319 (released July 18, 1986).
56. See In the Matter of Section 73.355 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636]
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planned FCC actions. Proceedings examining the possible lifting of BOC entry restrictions would surely be controversial.
Though the present sentiment in Congress seems to favor relaxation of the restrictions, there is no guarantee that this sentiment will remain unchanged or as broadly based as currently
seems to be the case. Nor is there any assurance, even assuming Congressional support for relaxation of the restrictions continues, that Congress will not attempt to intervene in some
form to influence the conditions attached to BOC entry into
particular markets.
In short, it is not certain that the FCC, even if it wished to do
so, could act expeditiously to remove or substantially relax the
entry restrictions, or do so in a manner that does not impose
other significant costs.
A key assumption underlying the perception that the FCC
will provide a forum more favorable to BOC interests is that
there is little or no possibility that significant relief from the
line-of-business restrictions can be obtained through the judicial system in a timely manner. However, the court has not
ruled on a request to permanently waive a core restriction since
shortly after the divestiture.5 8 Subsequently there have been
developments that could influence the court in reexamining its
approach to enforcement of the core restrictions. For example,
pursuant to the decree's schedule, the conversion of the BOCs'
exchange networks was virtually complete in September 1986.
The completion of the equal access conversion is significant in
that it diminishes (though does not dispose of) arguments that
permitting the BOCs to re-enter the interexchange market
would influence BOCs to engineer their networks in a manner
that favors their own services over those of other providers.
More important, even before its support of the Dole Bill, the
Department of Justice indicated that it might be willing to concur in removal of the information services ban in circumstances
short of disappearance of the local exchange monopoly. 59 Speof the Commissions's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, para. 112 (1984).
57. See, e.g., In the Matter of Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (j)(1)(i) and (ii),
the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, Tentative Decision and Request for
Further Comments, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1983).
58. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 868.
59. Comments of the United States Department of Justice at 27-28, In the Matter
of Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (D.D.C.
1985) (No. 85-229) [hereinafter Third Computer Inquiry].
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cifically, the Department suggested that a highly unbundled
form of exchange access (Open Network Architecture or ONA)
might make discriminatory interconnection sufficiently unlikely so that the Department would be willing to reexamine
the need for the decree's information services restrictions. The
FCC recently adopted that suggestion as a basic element in its
decision to remove the previously imposed structural separation requirements."
Though the concept of ONA has yet to be precisely defined,
much less implemented, it seems inevitable that the Department of Justice soon will be prepared to recommend lifting the
information services restriction. Further, although the Department has not so indicated, the establishment of ONAs might
well lead the Department to a similar conclusion regarding interexchange services. In short, though it is unclear whether the
Department would be in a position to make recommendations
in its January 1987 report to the court 61 on the basis of the
ONA concept in view of its somewhat vague outlines at present,
it does seem probable that the Department would be willing to
do so in the reasonably near future.
Of course, even if this were to happen, there is no guarantee
that the court would agree that a new form of access eliminates
the rationale for the restrictions. Indeed, the court has specifically stated, albeit in dicta, that it will not consider the relaxation of the restrictions until there is a significant reduction in
market power of the BOCs' local exchange operations.6 2 The
court has traditionally paid significant deference to the Department of Justice's views on the MFJ, however, and it is certainly
not a foregone conclusion that the court would not accept these
views if the Department makes the case that an ONA substantially reduces the potential for leveraging of monopoly power.
Finally, a clear trade-off for greater freedom to diversify into
exchange telecommunications-related markets is the potential
for enhanced exposure to the risk of antitrust litigation or liability. In practice, the MFJ currently operates to bar the BOCs
from participation in markets where, according to antitrust
theory, the potential for anticompetitive conduct is greatest.
While the consent decree's line-of-business restrictions clearly
60. Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order in Docket No. 85-229, FCC 86-252,
51 Fed. Reg. 24,350, paras. 220-22 (released June 16, 1986).
61. See supra note 11.
62. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 868.
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impose a penalty on the BOCs in erecting barriers to activities
in which the BOCs might otherwise profitably engage, the restrictions have also freed the BOCs in large measure from the
antitrust exposure and uncertainty that plagued the Bell System for over a decade as a result of the Bell System's participation in both exchange telecommunications and exchange
telecommunications dependent competitive activities. Mere reintegration into these markets does not imply that the antitrust
experiences of the Bell System will be repeated. Re-entry into
these markets, however, will certainly subject the BOCs to
special scrutiny, both from competitors and law enforcement
agencies-in an industry that is no stranger to antitrust litigation and which, for the next several years, will continue to experience the turmoil inherent in the transition from a heavily
regulated to a highly competitive marketplace. In such circumstances, the line between vigorous but lawful competition and
unlawful leveraging of monopoly power may be difficult to discern at times and frequently subject to dispute.

VI

Conclusion
Regardless of whether the Dole Bill or similar legislation is
ever enacted, its introduction marks a turning point in United
States telecommunications policy. The entry of the AT&T consent decree vested enormous responsibility for oversight of the
telecommunications industry in the judiciary and in the Department of Justice and established an overlapping and, at least
in theory, potentially conflicting scheme of federal regulation.
The Department's expressed desire to relinquish that authority
to the FCC clearly signals a movement toward a more modest
policymaking role for the Department and an eventual return
of central policymaking authority to the FCC.
The BOCs' decision to pursue a legislative strategy to remove
the line-of-business restrictions clearly presents several risks,
but has already produced what is likely to be regarded as a significant benefit-a more ambivalent view in the Department of
Justice regarding the line-of-business restrictions, and the Department's own role and that of antitrust in the development of
telecommunications policy.

